have taken little time and pleasure in, even as we specialize in late Victorian or
Modernist literature. This book, with its fine, lucid writing, its unembarrassed
passion for neglected poets, brought me back to my graduate student days, when
so much was new, so much to be discovered. For those sensations, I am grateful.
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Lee Oser. The Return of Christian Humanism: Chesterton, Eliot, Tolkien,
and the Romance ofHistory. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.
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In The Return of Christian Humanism: Chesterton, Eliot, Tolkien, and the Romance
of History, Lee Oser, a professor of literature at Holy Cross College, follows
Chesterton's lead in taking on the heretics, decadents, and aesthetes within the
postmodernist critical establishment, extolling Chesterton, Eliot, and Tolkien as
defenders of reason and romance and vilifYing influential late twentieth-centuty
critics such as Harold Bloom and Helen Vendler, whose alleged attacks on the
liberal humanist tradition Oser sees as having eroded not only literary scholarship
but indeed the very underpinnings of democratic society. In his preface Oser
asserts, "Without scruple or debate, our schools condone the blindest intellectual
prejudice of the twentieth century, and maybe the key to its horrors, the idea that
religion is the enemy of art and culture" (ix). But Chesterton, Eliot, and Tolkien,
having written during a period when "the institutional arrangements of our own
time were visible," Oser observes, "give us the chance for renewal and renaissance ....
They were embattled but not wholly isolated figures, major writers in English who
understood their art as an effort to keep the sacred wellsprings of culture open"
(x). Oser-like Chesterton: a novelist, apologist, and critic combined-clearly
understands his own art similarly, and this book as his own effort to keep these
wellsprings open.
Oser situates liberal humanism in the cultural traditions inherited from Greece,
Rome, and Catholic Europe and examines how those traditions were affected
by developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, culminating in
Matthew Arnold. Arnold, says Oser, was a "liminal" figure, arriving at "the end
of the tradition of Renaissance humanism that runs from Erasmus through Swift
and Pope; and he wrote the prologue to the Christian humanism that begins anew
with Chesterton" (12). Arnold's humanism is in the Renaissance tradition, Oser
explains, because it is Aristotelian in nature, pivoting on the question, "What are
the grounds ofhuman flourishing?" Arnold also marks an end of the medieval and
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Renaissance fusion of faith and art, however; in his attempt to replace religion,
which he saw as outmoded by science, with poetry, he "estranged both the
Christian and the aesthete, who found him neither inspiring nor credible. He
was too heretical for one and too earnest for the other" (I4). Oser identifies the
1873 publi~tion of aesthete Walter Pater's Studies in the History ofthe Renaissance
as the begin~ing of the late Victorian backlash against Arnold that would remain
in force through the much of twentieth century. (T.S. Eliot and Terry Eagleton
are referenced as two prominent critics of Arnoldian humanism.) Even so, Oser
writes, "the 'end of the nineteenth century did not witness the entire collapse of
humanism, but it was a period touched by considerable anxiety in intellectual
circles." Oser cites the decline of empire, the continuing conflicts between science
and faith, the. flamboyant decadence exemplified by Oscar Wilde, the ability of
the new p~~s to create rapid shifts in public opinion, along with social instability
generated by the rise of the working classes, as contributing factors to this fin de
siecle anxiety that set the stage for he advent of Chesterton: "Somehow out of this
smoke and fog emerged the most gifted defender of Christian humanism since
Erasmus. I speak, of course, of Chesterton" (I8).
Chapter 2 of Oser's book is devoted to Chesterton, and the degree of Oser's
devotion isinade clear immediately with such large claims as this: "The career of
Chesterton'itands as a victory for humankind. It represents the last major victory
over cos~icidespair, which menaces our own period in the form ofanti-humanism"
(21). It is· ~6t clear, however, why Oser considers Chesterton's the "last major
victory" ove;despair, since the following two chapters present Eliot and Tolkien as
comrades-in:.'arms with Chesterton in the battle against despair. But Chesterton's
victory, acco;~ing to Oser, lay in his "rebuilding of humanistic confidence on the
orthodox pl~nks of the Apostle's Creed" (26). What most attracted Chesterton. to
orthodoxy was its ability to harmonize reason with romance, common sense with
mysticism, and it was orthodoxy that enabled Chesterton to achieve a "synthes~s
of faith and .reason" that occupied "a middle ground between two dogmatic
IOgI~S
' · ." : the "godless scientism" of Bertrand Russell and the "occult
.
epIstemo
mysticism" of~lliam Buder Yeats.
.
Although. C;:<hesterton was not the first to argue for a ~llddl~ g~~und bem:een
scientism and mysticism, Oser admits, his triumph conSIsted m approach[mg]
these ideas .with ordinary people in mind." Chesterton took advantage of ~e
Edwardian ~'ellthusiasm for the field ofdebate," a field that extended from the publIc
. th· e pages 0 fthe daily newspapers'
and in.
this field "cultivated the
Iecture hall s to
"
'
1
<·
h
I
'
C-'low"
(22)
And
like
so
many
prevIOUS commentators
.
.
Ch nStIanSOl t atwas ymglaL.
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on Chesterton's criticism, Oser locates its power in its deliberate provocatIon of Its
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Christian humanism effectively out of the academy. At the same time, the study
of literature has much declined" (85). Oser here conflates dogmatic modernist
relativism with multiculturalism, engaging in some Chestertonian punning when
he takes multiculturalism to mean "encompassing a multitude of cults": "there
are larger and irrational forces at play, in the form of burgeoning cults." Among
these Oser lists the cults of feminism, neo-Marxism, anti-humanism, technology,
wellness, environmentalism, and the cult of the media, all of which, he argues,
"hinges [sic], in the end, on unspoken religious beliefs. And if we acknowledge
those beliefs, then the thesis of this chapter will not seem incendiary or absurd:
a bias against Christianity has separated literary studies from the tradition and
closed off the avenues to renewal" (85). Oser's assertion that his thesis is neither
incendiary nor absurd depends on his audience, however: readers who pick up the
book out of an interest in Christian humanism, Chesterton, or Tolkien are likely
to be predisposed to accept it outright, but readers who happen to be familiar with
the work of either Harold Bloom or Helen Vendler might well find it incendiary
and, if not absurd, at least questionable on several points.
One assertion that readers who share Oser's assumptions about modern culture
would be predisposed to accept, while others might well find incendiary, appears
in the second paragraph of Chapter 2:

readers: "There is a sense in Chesterton's work that he is accusing his countrymen
of sloth, the capital sin of accedia, a rype of depression understood by Christian
writers as lethargy, apathy and virtues left to drift. That is not bad way of describing
England in the 1890s" (23). That is to say, decadent England, and Oser accounts
for Chesterton's passionate opposition to the decadents by portraying him as a
renegade aesthete: "Chesterton reacted with a fierce apostasy against the aesthetic
movement." Oser then quotes Chesterton's criticism of the carpe diem philosophy
of the aesthetes and comments, "By isolating discrete moments in the flux of time,
Pater attained a frozen perfection. But he robbed man of the continuity through
time where his nature achieves its fullest expression. For Chesterton, our existence
'is a story'" (24). Chesterton's view oflife as a narrative is one he shares with Oser,
who further observes:
Chesterton's appeal to narrative is philosophically profound; at the same time, it
reminds us that he is a novelist .... Pater wrote a veiled genre of autobiography that
he called "imaginary portraits"-finely woven reveries of impressions, memories, and
desires. Chesterton wrote novels whose acrobatic heroes piece together their lives
through moral acts which restore friendship and community. (24)

The relationship Oser sketches here berween narrative, ethics, friendship, and
community, is of course Aristotelian in origin, and is illustrated here with an
examination of Chesterton's novel The Flying Inn. Oser concludes that Chesterton's
protagonists "retain a physical wholeness of viewpoint that is increasingly rare. It
is only the whole man who knows what ails the aesthetes, the therapists, and the
governing class" (35). This atypical viewpoint, coupled with Chesterton's love of
Gothic architecture, leads Oser to address the question, "Was Chesterton's mind
medieval?" (a charge commonly leveled at him by "progressives" both in his own
day and in ours). Oser's response:

On the spiritual frontier, the vaguely Christian West is looking increasingly
gnostic-the richest cults pull their floats in that direction. Technology, feminism,
postmodernism, and the youth media tend to suppress the guidance of nature and
reason. Literature, on the other hand, cannot wholly abandon the conditions of its
birth. There is such civilized pleasure in opening a good book. It is a sensual and
intellectual act that militates, like Chaucer's pilgrims themselves, against gnostic
alienation. But many recent critics are gnostic in spirit; agents of the times, they have
done almost everything in their unconscious and irrational power to lay the literary

His medievalism operates in his belief in the unifYing force of Christendom, in his

tradition to rest. (86)

sympathy for popular superstition, in his curious mingling of real piety and worldly
wisdom. His economic theory of disrributism does not fit the world we live in-with

•

the possible exception of Vermont. But generally, Chesterton's thinking is molded and
tempered by a humanistic liberalism that engages modernity. (30)

Oser's own thinking is equally molded by humanistic liberalism and equally eager
to engage modernity (or perhaps post-modernity in Oser's case), and it is just such
an engagement that constitutes Chapter 6 of the book, "Artificial Taste."
Oser sees modernist cultural relativism as inimical to liberal humanism and to
scholarship. Chapter 6 opens with a direct attack on recent trends in academia:
"Over the past decades, a dogmatically relativist type of modernism has pushed
268
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Gnosticism, let us remember, originally referred to the beliefs of early Christian
sects deemed heretical by the established church, sects whose teachings derived
from either private revelation, non-canonical scriptures, or some combination of
the rwo. Eventually the meaning expanded to include any sort of religious beliefs
that departed too far from Catholic or Protestant orthodoxy, and it is in this
sense that Chesterton uses the term in discussing Blake (although many of Blake's
religious ideas bore affinities with some early Gnostic doctrines). But Oser and
other present-day Roman Catholic commentators on literature and culture employ
the term more loosely to describe not only ideas but attitudes that contradict
Catholic orthodoxy or liberal humanism as Oser has defined it. Here, however,
FALL 2009
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Oser seems to be using "gnostic" as a synonym for "solipsistic"; thus gnostic critiCs
would be those who advance a private, idiosyncratic view of literature and culture
that not only divorces them from both nature and reason but also undermines the
possibility of the communal experience of literature that perpetuates and is itself
perpetuated by tradition and culture. But while Harold Bloom might not balk
at being labeled as a gnostic, since he has written extensively on the relationship
between gnosticism, literature, and criticism, others such as Helen Vendler might
find such a characterizatio'n incendiary; and I find it questionable, ifnot absurd. "
Oser bases his indi'ctment of Bloom and Vendler on their attacks on T.S. Eliot,
whom Oser lionizes earlier in,the,book as one of the three great hopes for the
return of Christian humanism. (It should be noted that Oser previouslYPllblished
a well-reviewed critical analysis of Eliot's work; so just as Chestert~n' did with
Dickens, Browning; and Shaw, he is here employing the opportunity to defend one
of his favorite writers against what he sees as misguided and misleading 'criticisms
of his work.) Oser quotes a few,"venomous" passages from essays by Bloom and
Vendler in which the critics "skewer" Eliot and Matthew Arnold (86-93), and then'
indulges in a bit of skewering of his own. In comparing Bloom's and Vendler's
attacks on Eliot, and thus implicitly on the entire liberal humanist tradition,
Oser lampoons both: "Harold Bloom played opposite the diva's [Vendler's] glassshattering soprano iu' that celebrated mock-opera of the late twentieth century,
'The Triumph of Decidence,' 'where everyone is madly in love with himself" (91):
While the imagery and, idea here are reminiscent of Chesterton's caricat~res of
the decadents of his own day, the wit is markedly more acerbic than Chesterton's:
Chesterton's skewering of ~is opponents (at least in his early writing) tended to be
far more gentle in tone;though no less deadly.
,
After toppling Ve,ndler and Bloom from their "bad eminence," Oserreturns
to Walter Pater, noting that Bloom considers himself a "Liberal who 'particularly
loved' Pater, who likewise turns all criticism into self-portraiture" (95). In his
earlier chapter on :Chesterton, Oser criticized Pater as having "robbed man of
the continuity through time where his nature achieves its fullest expression" (24);
Here, however, he sees in Pater "a kind of slender and beautiful bridge, a crumbling
remnant of the high 'culture that Bloom and Vendler accidentally dynamited" (95).
But Bloom resembles Pa!er, Oser contends, only that in both cases, "tra,ditional
loves and loyalties bow to the subjective glories of the self." Ultimately, for Oser,
the critical works of both Bloom and Vendler represent "prime examples of gnostic
aestheticism" in their self-absorption and their repudiation of reason and nature.
Oser quotes Bloom ?S writing (in Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Creative
Minds), that ~'Gnosticismhas been indistinguishable from imaginary genius .... it is
270
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pragmatically the religion ofliterature," and concludes from this, "Here we in fact
uncover the truth of Bloom's splitting the tradition into Catholic and Protestant
authors: it is really a split between Christians and Gnostics" (99). It is not at all
clear to this reader, however, how "we" can uncover such a truth from the quoted
passage, so Oser must be assuming that his readers are familiar with more of
Bloom's work than is represented here. This again raises the question of audience:
is Oser writing for Christian readers interested in Chesterton, Eliot, and Tolkien,
or for academicians under the spell of Bloom and Vendler? If the former, then
Oser's readers will likely accept his characterizations of these prominent critics
without question, and the quotations he has selected as representative of their
work; if the latter, such unquestioning acceptance is highly unlikely.
For Oser then proceeds to color Vendler as anti-Christian based on equally
fragmentary quotations, writing, "Vendler proceeds from a dogmatic assertion:
'Selves come with'a history: souls are independent of time and space'" (99). Oser
makes an enormoUs logical leap here in taking this to mean, "If poetry must do
without history, that rules out Homer, Virgil, Dante, the Beowulf poet, Chaucer,
the Gawain poet, Spenser, Shakespeare, Dryden, Johnson, Wordsworth, Tennyson,
Browning, Whitman, c. Rossetti, Dickinson, Hardy, Frost, Eliot, Marianne Moore,
Auden, and Wilbur, to name a few" (99-100). It is at this point that I find Oser's
argument absurd. Vendler never claimed that "poetry must do without history," at
least not in the qugted passage, where she is merely drawing a distinction between
"souls" and "selves" (a distinction which cannot be understood, as in the Bloom
quote, without a knowledge of the rest ofVendler's work). Nor, to my knowledge,
does Vendler an~h~re else assert or suggest that "poetry must do without history."
In fact, in Poems, Poets, Poetry, which I use as a textbook in my Studies in Poetry
class, Vendler advi~es poets who wish to create credible lyric speakers that "The
single most successful way is to give your speaker not only a present but a past, and
often not just a yesterday, but the day before that, and the year before that, and five
years before that. (See Wordsworth's 'Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern
Abbey' for a stu~ning lengthy version of this process)" (177). In the same book
Vendler devotes an entire to chapter to "History and Regionality," beginning with
the remark, "Poetry is always interested in time and space.... It is also interested
in time specified-in history" (241). Therefore Oser is either unfamiliar with the
larger body ofVendler's work, or has deliberately distorted it to suit his polemical
purposes (a question equally applicable to some of Chesterton's attacks on his
opponents). Oser delivers his coup de grace to Bloom and Vendler as follows:
Where, one asks, are these critics coming from? A cynic might say their behavior is
predictable. Having been rewarded for their anti-Christian posture over the years, they
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have learned to express that position in what is heretically its purest form. Freed from
the tradition of the great poet-critics from Dryden to Eliot, poetry according to Bloom
and Vendler speaks for the soul's liberation from human nature and from God, the
soul's discovery of its supremacy to the created order.

Here Oser most succinctly expresses his definition of Gnosticism-"the soul's
discovery of its supremacy to the created order"-but it remains questionable
whether such a view of literature accurately characterizes the criticism of either
Bloom or Vendler, without a more thorough examination of their work as a whole.
Chapter 6 of The Return of Christian Humanism concludes with a reference to
Eliot's comment in a 1933 lecture that "we are still in Arnold's period" and the
suggestion that "By way of Chesterton, Eliot was able to connect Arnoldian liberal
humanism to the spiritual decay of the academy" (101). And even Bloom and
Vendler, Oser admits, "may owe something of their literary faith to Arnold, but
they denied what is most lasting in this thought: his sense of tradition, his true
pragmatism, his appeal to reason and nature." Thus while Oser's characterizations
of contemporary academic culture and the critics who most prominently represent
it may be distorted and overly shrill in places, the book as a whole convincingly
identifies these most lasting elements of Arnold's thought as accounting for the
durability of Oser's chosen subjects.
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